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Why U.S. accusations against Chinese satellites may backfire

Jessica Durdu

A Long March 2-C rocket carrying a satellite jointly developed by China and France, dubbed the Space Variable Objects Monitor, lifts off from a space base in Xichang, southwest China's Sichuan Province, June 22, 2024. /CFP
A Long March 2-C rocket carrying a satellite jointly developed by China and France, dubbed the Space Variable Objects Monitor, lifts off from a space base in Xichang, southwest China's Sichuan Province, June 22, 2024. /CFP

A Long March 2-C rocket carrying a satellite jointly developed by China and France, dubbed the Space Variable Objects Monitor, lifts off from a space base in Xichang, southwest China's Sichuan Province, June 22, 2024. /CFP

Editor's note: Jessica Durdu, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is a foreign affairs specialist and PhD candidate in international relations at China Foreign Affairs University. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

A recent U.S. State Department memo urging foreign "ally" governments not to use Chinese satellite services is yet another example of the U.S. expanding the scope of security to dominate areas of international cooperation and isolate China.

From trade to technology, and now outer space, Washington continues to securitize issues that were once treated as civilian, commercial, or scientific ones. This so-called securitization strategy may carry long-term risks of credibility loss in a multipolar world order that increasingly values autonomy and balanced cooperation.

While the memo emphasizes concerns over military information leaks, sensitive intelligence, and national security, it also exposes contradictions in the very logic it promotes. The essence of its argument is that Chinese satellite services, such as those provided by Chinese enterprise Chang Guang Satellite Technology, pose a risk because the data collected could be accessed by the Chinese government.

However, this claim fails to acknowledge that American satellite service providers are not immune to political influence or misuse. Elon Musk's refusal to extend satellite Internet connection to Crimea via his Starlink network in 2022 highlights how U.S.-based private satellite providers can act based on political calculations, without any legal obligation to comply with broader U.S. government policies. This raises the possibility that reliance on American service providers may create greater political risk than engagement with non-American providers.

The U.S. appeal to national security is thus not a principled stand against surveillance or coercion, but a selective narrative aimed at protecting U.S. economic dominance and geopolitical control. The claim that cooperation with Chinese firms will lead to "a monopolistic, Beijing-controlled market" is laced with irony. The U.S. has long exerted monopolistic control in areas like cloud computing, communications, and defense systems. Furthermore, the Starlink precedent demonstrates that the U.S. government has either encouraged or tolerated commercial practices that are deeply political in nature, using corporations as tools of informal foreign policy. This makes Washington's critique of China's intentions both contradictory and strategically self-defeating.

From an international relations perspective, this memo is a textbook case of securitization where a state redefines a routine issue, such as satellite services, as an existential threat requiring unusual measures. Securitization narratives are socially constructed and serve political interests rather than reflecting objective threats. The decision to label Chinese satellites as "untrusted suppliers" is less about technical vulnerabilities and more about reinforcing ideological boundaries and justifying exclusionary practices. Such practices, when repeated across multiple domains, erode trust among allies and encourage the emergence of alternative institutions and networks outside the U.S. orbit.

A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket launches two Galileo satellites for the European Commission from the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida, United States, September 17, 2024. /CFP
A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket launches two Galileo satellites for the European Commission from the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida, United States, September 17, 2024. /CFP

A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket launches two Galileo satellites for the European Commission from the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida, United States, September 17, 2024. /CFP

These concerns are not limited to space technologies. U.S. tech giants such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon have all faced scrutiny for collecting and monetizing user data. Whistleblowers like Edward Snowden have revealed how the U.S. National Security Agency collaborated with American firms to conduct mass surveillance, including on foreign allies. The Cambridge Analytica scandal demonstrated how data gathered through Facebook could be used to influence political outcomes, including elections. These precedents have created a global awareness that U.S. technologies, while innovative, are not apolitical or free from state entanglement.

In light of these contradictions, the global response to the State Department memo is likely to see it as an attempt to politicize technological competition and enforce an increasingly fragile U.S.-centric order. This approach of the U.S. could further alienate partners, who already face mounting costs due to groundless U.S. tariff decisions.

China, for its part, has shown resilience in the face of such pressure. Countries such as Egypt and Pakistan are exploring commercial satellite deals with Chinese firms not because they reject American technology, but because they desire a more balanced and less conditional partnership.

Ultimately, the securitization of space cooperation may have unintended consequences for the U.S. By framing technological advancements from China as national security threats, Washington risks damaging its credibility and alienating countries that are tired of zero-sum choices.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X, formerly Twitter, to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

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